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Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge 
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P. 0. Box 483 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK R. GEORGE, dba 
GEORGE & SON CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 

















Case NoG 18359 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by FRANK R. GEORGE, dba GEORGE & 
SON CONSTRUCTION, Plaintiff-Respondent, against OREN LIMITED & 
ASSOCIATES, a Partnership, for judgment of $42,687.57, plus 
interest, costs and attorney's fees for services and materials 
provided in the installation of a sewer line, culinary water 
service, and road grading, and for a lien against the property 
so served. 
Defendant counterclaimed for damages for breach of con-
tract in timely performance. 
Defendant further claimed as an affirmative defense that 
Plaintiff was not a licensed contractor and therefore unable to 
maintain the action. 
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DISPOSTION BELOW 
Trial of this action was to a jury, who by special 
interrogatories, awarded the Plaintiff damages against the 
Defendant in the amount of $58,482.41 and attorney's fees 
of $2,700.00. 
Prior to trial, Defendants moved for an Order of 
Dismissal (R-131) which was heard before The Honorable Judge 
Douglas Cornaby and the motion denied, pending evidence to 
be submitted at trial (R-139-140). 
The motion was renewed at time of trial (Transcript 
p. 141) and was denied. 
After entry of verdict, Defendant filed a Motion for 
Judgment of Dismissal Non Obstante Veridico (N.O.V.) (R-249-250). 
The motion was heard on Wednesday, March 3, 1982, pursuant to 
notice (R-259). The motion was denied (R-261) and judgment on 
the verdict entered. 
Defendant appeals the denial of an Order of Dismissal 
of The Honorable Judge Douglas Cornaby entered February 8, 
1982 {Transcript p. 141) and the denial of a Motion to Dismiss 
on March 5, 1982. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks to have the jury verdict and 
the judgment entered thereon reversed and vacated and the 
Plaintiff's Complaint dismissed. Defendant-Appeallant alleges 
that failure to grant Judgment of Dismissal was an error in law. 
- 2 -
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Respondent GEORGE and Defendant-Appellant 
entered into a series of construction contracts in May of 
1979 whereby Plaintiff-Respondent GEORGE would trench and 
install a sewer line, a water line, grade and blacktop, as 
well as install curb, gutter and sidewalls on certain sub-
division property in Davis County, Utah (Exhibitis "B", "C", 
"D" and "E") • 
At the time of entering into the contract to provide 
~ 
improvements to the land, the Plaintiff-Respondent was not 
licensed with the Department of Business Regulation as a 
contractor in any capacity (Transcript p. 17-18). Plaintiff-
Respondent GEORGE had licensed for the year 1969 and had not 
re-licensed until 1980. In connection with the reasons for 
which Plaintiff-Respondent was not licensed, on page 53 of 
the Transcript, he states: 
"Q Any other reason you didn't license in 1970 or 
in subsequent years? 
A Yes, there was a reason. 
Q What was that? 
A I didn't like the bureaucracy that dominated that 
sort of thing." 
On page 64 of the Transcript Plaintiff-Appellant 
states: 
"Q You indicated, Mr. George, you didn't like the 
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bureaucracy. Why didn't you like the bureaucracy of the 
licensing department? 
A Well, it was my contention they were revenue 
raising agencies. They are not a regulator. They don't 
know whether I know what I am doing or not." 
JOSEPH KAPLAN, chief executive officer of OREN LTD., 
a rec:ent immigrant, one of the partners, did not know the 
Plaintiff-Respondent FRANK GEORGE (transcript p. 205). Mr. 
Kaplan responded: 
"Q At the time you entered into the contract, did 
you know Mr. George? 
A No. 
Q Had you ever met him? 
A My first and only meeting was at Jim Bird's office 
until yesterday. 
Q That was your last meeting until yesterday? 
A Yes. 
Q Would you have contracted with Mr. Bird if you had 
known he was not licensed? 
A You mean Mr. George? 
Q I mean Mr. George, I am sorry. 
A I don't think so. I would have inquired what li-
censing means in America. But I don't believe I would because. 
Q I have no further questions." 
- 4 -
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The Plaintiff-Respondent GEORGE stated (Transcript p. 4) 
that he knew Jack Sullivan some twenty years ago. 
"Q And do you know a Mr. Jack or John Sullivan? 
A Yes sir, I do. 
Q Okay, how do you know him? 
A I knew Jack Sullivan first as.ooa ••o he lived in 
.my neighborhood some twenty years ago." 
When Sullivan was questioned about his connection with 
GEORGE, he responded (Transcript p. 114): 
"A I had known Frank for a number of years. I con-
sidered him to be an honorable man." 
When questioned more carefully about Sullivan's acquain-
tance with Mr. George, he said (Transcript po 211-212): 
"Q Now in your previous testimony, you said you had 
known Mr. George before you entered into this contract with him. 
What was the nature of your acquaintanceship with Mr. George? 
A We were neighbors for about nine years, from late '57 
up to '66. 
Q All right. During that time did you ever contract 
with Mr. George? 
A No. 
Q Were you ever a shareholder or a partner of any 
business entities that contracted with Mr. George? 
A No, I had no business dealings. 
- 5 -
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Q Did you know what his business was at that time? 
A Yes, I understood that he was--
Q Had you ever had any conversations at that time with 
anyone who had done business with Mr. George? 
A No particular discussions. I had an associate that 
George was doing a job for at Clearfield. 
Q That was at a later time, was it not? 
A No, that was just a little earlier time. 
Q A little earlier than this contract? 
A Yes, uh-huh. 
Q All right. Now other than that, did you have any 
/ 
/ 
acquaintance with Mr. George? 
A No. 
Q You never had any financial dealings with him? 
A None. 
Q Well, would you have contracted with Mr. George had you 
known he was not licensed? 
A Absolutely not." 
The foregoing is not a summary but is the complete record 
of the knowledge and prior acquaintance which Mr. Joseph Kaplan 
and Mr. Jack Sullivan had with Plaintiff-Respondent Frank George. 
Mr. George did not post a bond or other security (Tran-
~cript p. 64). 
Mr. George had to take a competency exam to become licensed 
after 11-1/2 years of unlicensed status (Transcript p. 66). 
Mr. George held himself out to be a contractor, submitted 
bids and otherwise engaged in contracting work for 11-1/2 years 
(Transcript pp. 5, 9, 17, 18 and others). 
- 6 -
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ARGUMENT 
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, 
AS THE PLAINTIFF HAS NO CAPACITY TO SUE IN THE 
COURTS OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND IS THUS PRECLUDED 
FROM OBTA~NING DAMAGES. 
The Plaintiff seeks to recover for services and 
materials he rendered as a contractor. In order for the 
Plaintiff to state a claim, he must allege that at the time 
the work was performed and the materials furnished, he was 
licensed as a contractor under the laws of the State of Utah. 
states: 
58-23-1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, states: 
License required for contracting--Prima facie 
evidence of contracting.--It shall be unlawful for 
any person, firm, copartnership, corporation, asso-
ciation, or other organization, or any combination 
of any thereof, to engage in the business or act in 
the capacity of contractor within this state with-
out having a license therefor as herein provided, 
unless such person, firm, copartnership, .corporation, 
association, or other organization is particularly 
exempted as provided in this act. Evidence of the 
securing of any construction or building permit from 
a government agency, or the employment of any person 
on a construction project, or the offering of any 
bid to do the work of a contractor as herein defined, 
shall be accepted in any court of the state of Utah 
as prirna f acie evidence of engaging in the business 
or acting in the capacity of a contractor. 
Also, 58-23-18 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
Acting as contractor without license--Misde-
meanor. --Any person, firm, copartnership, corpora-
tion, association, or other organization, acting in 
the capacity of contractor within the meaning of 
this act, without a license as herein provided shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
- 7 -
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The above cited statutes have been almost uniformly 
interpreted by the courts of this and other states in such a 
way as to preclude enforcement of payment under a contract 
when the contractor was unlicensed. 
In a series of cases in the State of Utah, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that an unlicensed contractor has no 
standing in the courts. Meridian Corporation v. McGlynn/ 
Carmaker Co., 567 P.2 1110, (Utah 1977) citing Smith v. 
American Packing & Provision Co., 130 P.2 951, 102 Ut. 351, 
(1942), and Olsen v. Reese, 220 P.2 733, 114 Ut. 411, (1948), 
Chief Justice Ellett, speaking for the court stated: 
This Court has held that the contracts of 
unlicensed contractors are void. In the case 
of Olsen v. Reese we held: 
The authorities are fairly uniform to the 
effect that failure to obtain a license which 
is required by a statute enacted solely for 
revenue purposes does render contracts made 
by the offending party void. On the other hand, 
contracts made by an unlicensed contractor when 
in violation of a statute passed for the protec-
tion of the public are held to be void and unen-
forceable. Our statute is so worded as to indi-
cate a legislative intent to protect the citizens 
from irresponsible contractors. The statute, 
while not comprehensive provides for a small li-
cense fee. Control over the contractor is given 
to the Department of Registration. Upon an 
appropriate hearing, the department may, for un-
professional conduct, suspend or cancel the 
license. Good reputation and integrity are essen-
tial to obtaining a license and the entire object 
of the statute is protection of the public against 
fraudulent and illegal practice, which have always 
been recognized as a distinct characteristic of 
statutes, which are not mere revenue measures. 
The statute being enacted for the protection of 
the public, Plaintiff's written contract is void. 
- 8 -
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The case of Smith v. American Packing & Pro-
vision Co. held that it was necessary for a 
plaintiff, where a license is required, to allege 
that he had the license in order to state a cause 
of action. A license in another state cannot be 
substituted for a license in Utah. 
The Plaintiff in this case is aware of our 
clear prior holdings; however, he urges us to over-
rule the case of Olsen v. Reese (supra, footnote 3 ). 
This we refuse to do. We think the case was proper-
ly decided, and we confirm the principles of law 
therein stated to be the law of this state. 
In the case of Mosley v. Johnson, 22 U.2d 348, 453 P.2d 
149 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court decided a case very similar 
to the one before the Court at this time. 
In Mosely, the Court concluded that a contract entered 
into by an unlicensed welldriller was void and unenforceable. 
Regarding the Plaintiff's quantum meruit claim and lien claim, 
the Court in·Mosely concluded by stating: 
"A court will no more assist one who fails to 
secure a required license to recover money by 
means of a lien foreclosure than it will in an 
action on the contract or on a theory of quan-
tum meruit. Since there is nothing due plain-
tiff in this matter •••• " 
The foregoing interpretation of contractor collection 
efforts while in violation of State licensing laws is consistent 
with the law of most states. 
51 Am Jur. 2d Licenses and Permits Sec. 64 states: 
Under a statute providing that a contractor can-
not maintain an action unless he alleges and proves 
that he was duly licensed at all times during the 
performance of the contract or when his cause of ac-
tion arose, it is commonly held that he cannot reco-
ver if he was not duly licensed at the time specified 
in the statute or if his license had expired or been 
revoked during the performance of the contract, re-
gardless of whether he became duly licensed thereafter, 
and regardless of the period that elapsed between the 
time when he was not licensed and the time when he 
became licensed. 
- 9 -
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See also 82 A.L.R. 2d 1429, 1443. On some occasions 
and for specific purposes the rule laid down by the foregoing 
cases has been modified as in Fillmore Products v. Western 
Paving, 561 P.2d 682. In this case, while supporting the 
general rule, the court set forth some exceptions. In hold-
ing for the unlicensed contractor, Justice Wilkins, speaking 
for the Court said: 
We distinguish this case from those cited 
in note 2. In this case it is clear that an 
unlicensed subcontractor is dealing with a 
licensed general or original contractor. And 
the defendants have not disputed that the en-
tire sewer project was under the supervision 
of a licensed project engineer, that all of 
the work had to meet the specifications and 
requirements of the general contract and that 
all of the work had to be approved and accep-
ted by the project engineer before any payment 
was made by the Town of Ferron. 
We distinguish the current case from the Fillmore Pro-
ducts case in that (1) the contractor was not acting as a 
subcontractor to a general; Defendant-Appellant was a subdivider; 
and (2) the project was not under the control or direction of a 
project engineer. 
The Court also deviated from the general rule in Lignell 
v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800. Again, while sustaining the general 
rule, the Court set forth exceptions to the rule: 
This Court has had frequent occasion to com-
ment on the status of unlicensed contractors, 
and has persistently construed the cited statute 
as having been designed to protect the public 
and consequently to bar recovery by unlicensed 
contractors for services rendered under their 
contracts. The most recent Utah cases so holding 
- 10 -
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are Mosely v. Johnson, 22 Utah 2d 348, 453 P.2d 
149, and Meridian Corp. v. McGlynn Carmaker Com-
pany, Utah, 567 P.2d 1110. The rationale of 
those cases is, however, that the party from 
whom the contractor seeks to ~ecover is in the 
class the legislature intended to protect. A 
litigant is not a member of that class if the 
required protection (i.e., against inept and fi-
nancially irresponsible builders) is in fact 
afforded by another means ••• 
In this case, the denital of recovery to BBC 
would indeed impose unreasonable penalties and 
forfeitures, particularly because the Owners were 
never deprived of the kind of protection the li-
censing statute was designed to afford. We con-
sider the following circumstances to be of con-
trolling significance in this regard: 
1. BBC has not failed to satisfy the licen-
sing authority of its technical competence and 
financial qualification for license. It had 
inadvertently permitted its license to lapseo 
Restoration of licensed status involved no new 
demonstration of qualification, but only pay-
ment of fee. 
2. The Owners didd not rely on any BBC com-
petence they inferred from BBC's having adver-
tised itself as a general contractor. They had 
previously employed BBC as a builder in apartment 
house construction. Moreover, the Owners unsurped 
the general contractor's prerogatives in construc-
ting the Terrace Incline complex. They relied on 
their own competence. 
3. BBC supplied a performance bond as well as 
a labor and material suppliers payment bond. The 
Owners were infinitely better assured or adequate 
and complete performance without financial expo-
sure beyond the contact price than they would have 
been by BBC's mere compliance with the licensing 
statute. 
The Lignell case is likewise distinguishable from the 
case before the Court. Consider the following: 
(1) Plaintiff-Respondent GEORGE did not "just inadver-
tently" allow his license to lapse. He had rebelled against 
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the bureaucracy and for 11-1/2 years had practiced his trade 
as a contractor without a license, contrary to civil and 
criminal law. Licensing (it couldn't be called re-licensing) 
did not merely require payment of a fee--but required testing 
and examination. It did require a new demonstration of com-
petence. 
{2) In the Lignell case, the Owners knew contractor 
in his professional capacity and had done work with the con-
tractor previously. Moreover, in Lignell the Owners became 
their own general contractor, a stature they had taken before 
with the unlicensed contractor. 
In the case before the Court, the Defendants {one of 
whom was a foreigner) had not had previous subdivision experi-
ence and had had no professional or trade experience with 
Plaintiff-Respondent GEORGE. Defendant-Appellant KAPLAN knew 
him not at all. Defendant-Appellant SULLIVAN knew him from 
the neighborhood--and in no way professionally. Professionally, 
KAPLAN and SULLIVAN were "babes in the woods" as witness the 
agreements for a complicated construction project {Exhibits "B", 
"C" , "D" and "E") • 
(3) In the Lignell case, the contractor supplied a 
materialmen's and labor bond. The Court said they were better 
off with a bond than by merely complying with the license 
(does a bond legitimize a non-licensed contractor?) In the 
case before the Court, no bond was posted. 
- 12 -
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Further, Plaintiff~Respondent GEORGE held himself out 
to be a contractor, submitted bids, met with Defendant-Appel-
lant OREN LTD. at the engineer's office, and did those things 
characteristic of a licensed contractor. 
Finally, in the 1981 General Session of the Utah State 
Legislature, the following statute was enacted: SSA-1-26, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended: 
No contractor may act as agent or commence 
or maintain any action in any court of the state 
for collection of compensation for the perfor~ 
mance of any act for which a license is required 
by this chapter without alleging and proving 
that he was a duly licensed contractor when the 
contract sued upon was entered into and when the 
alleged cause of action arose. 
We readily admit that this statute was not in existence 
at the time the acts occurred which are the subject matter of 
this lawsuit. However, the passage of the statute demonstrates 
a philosophical legislative intent and perhaps was occasioned 
by the same time deviation from the general rule. 
Defendant-Appellant prays relief as set forth ·above. 
Respectfully submitted ·this ~ ~ day of June, 1982. 
& WILKINSON 
Lorin N. Pace 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
OREN LTD. & ASSOCIATES 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed two copies of the fore-
going Brief on Appeal to counsel for Plaintiff-Respondent: 
STEPHEN G. HOMER 
Attorney at Law 
P. o. Box 483 
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postage prepaid, this _l__ day of ~ 1982. 
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